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Rubel: In My View

IN MY VIEW

SECURING NATO’S WEAKEST FLANK

Sir:
I read the Winter 2016 article by Jonathan Altman, entitled “Russian A2/AD in
the Eastern Mediterranean: A Growing Risk,” and I would like to highlight the
urgency of securing NATO’s southern flank. NATO needs a stronger presence
in the Mediterranean to monitor activities and prevent attacks on its members.
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson has stated that there
is no plan to bolster scarce U.S. naval resources in the eastern Mediterranean.
This means NATO must adapt by increasing its presence on its southern flank
and boosting the military power of existing members to deter aggression in the
region. Greece is one member nation that could increase its involvement, thereby
strengthening NATO’s capabilities.
Greece is a key geopolitical point for NATO because it forms the alliance’s
southern tip, and its large eastern border is exposed to conflicts that unfold in
the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Athens is a trusted and capable ally. Even
though the country is facing financial difficulties, it is one of only five NATO
members that meet the alliance goal of spending two percent of gross domestic
product on defense, having consistently surpassed the minimum as far back as
1988.
While the United States has forward-deployed destroyers in Rota, Spain,
Washington should consider permanently basing an aircraft carrier, destroyers,
and amphibious ships at Souda Bay on the Greek island of Crete. These forces
could counter crises, provide more stability, and reinforce allies’ perceptions of
American might. Crete is closer than Rota to where threats are likely to unfold:
in the Middle East and North Africa. A Congressional Budget Office report
states that basing more ships and crews abroad will boost overseas operations on
a smaller budget.
NATO currently has twelve of its sixteen E-3 airborne warning and control system radar planes operating primarily out of the NATO air base in Geilenkirchen,
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Germany. This limits the availability of airborne surveillance and command, control, and communications functions for tactical and air-defense forces. Having
Global Hawks at Souda Bay could boost NATO’s real-time intelligence in theater,
and a combat search-and-rescue capability on Crete could provide for quick
responses across Europe, Africa, and the Levant. Military personnel deployed at
Souda Bay also would be able to further their educations and skill sets by participating in training and educational activities nearby at the NATO Missile Firing
Installation, the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center, and
other facilities on the island.
When the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya, was under attack in 2012, the U.S.
military was unable to respond for hours. American lives could have been saved
if the United States had sent aircraft from its Souda Bay naval base—it is located
only 750 miles from Libya. In the aftermath of that attack, a Marine antiterrorism detachment was added at Souda Bay to provide a quick-response capability
in the region.
Using Souda Bay better is a sound idea, as it is located very close to key danger
areas. Athens, Washington, and NATO should identify more opportunities to
work together synergistically and protect peace and commerce in the Mediterranean Sea.

CONSTANCE BAROUDOS

Vice President, Lexington Institute

RESPONSE TO STEVEN WILLS’S “THE EFFECT OF THE GOLDWATERNICHOLS ACT OF 1986 ON NAVAL STRATEGY, 1987–1994”: SOME
MISSING PIECES

Sir:
Steven Wills provided a very thought-provoking article in the Spring 2016 Naval
War College Review concerning the Navy’s loss of strategy-making authority owing to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (G-N) and the subsequent deterioration
of the Navy’s corporate ability to craft strategy, because of its inability to generate
a corps of officers with repeated tours in strategy-making billets.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/18
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However, G-N was not the only factor at work. A missing piece in Wills’s article is the recognition that necessity is not only the mother of invention; it is the
genesis of strategy. That is, the 1990s featured the lack of a compelling strategic
problem that needed to be solved. Without such a problem, attempting to craft
global strategy is akin to trying to clap with one hand. The 1980s Maritime Strategy was a solution to a strategic problem that arose in the 1970s. At the time, the
Soviet Navy had significantly expanded and the U.S. Navy came to the realization
(in part through war gaming at the Naval War College [NWC]) that a global war
with the Soviet Union might not go nuclear automatically. Simply shepherding
reinforcement shipping across the Atlantic was not enough; the Navy had to find
a way to take the offensive and help alleviate pressure on the NATO central front.
This created a need for a global conventional naval strategy. Although the decade
of the ’90s had its share of turbulence, the Navy could fall back on its well-oiled
tactical doctrine to deal with the challenges of the period.
However, it was a time of force reductions and competition among the services
for a share of the shrinking defense budget. What became critical for the Navy
was effective budget justification—the forte of N8. Thus, although N3/N5 was
starved of experienced strategists such as Captains Swartz, Harris, and Diamond,
N8 was populated by top-notch analysts such as Captain Arthur “Trip” Barber. In
this environment, N8 became dominant and insulated from N3/N5.
It appeared that in 2006 there was an incipient revival of the capability under
the leadership of Vice Admiral John Morgan as N3/N5 during Admiral Mike
Mullen’s reign as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). A major reason for this was
that Admiral Mullen had a global strategic problem to solve. The 9/11 attacks
generated a new global, maritime, strategic problem: how to prevent terrorists
from using the seas to mount attacks on the U.S. homeland and those of our
allies. The key to solving it was establishing a global partnership for maritime
security—a challenge that was both larger than the perspectives of the regional
unified combatant commanders and beyond the ken or interest of the Joint Staff.
Not having an in-place strategic apparatus to solve the problem, Admiral Mullen did two things: he turned to NWC, and he established a small, ad hoc task
force inside N51 composed of sharp, relatively junior officers. As the strategy
project developed, NWC faculty would conduct a program of research, gaming,
and outreach to create the underlying logic of a new strategy, and the N51 team
would articulate that logic by drafting a strategy document. The product of this
collaboration was the 2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”
(CS21). This document was not itself the strategy, which was essentially to court
foreign navies in a way that would secure their cooperation, but it was decisive
in making the strategy work. It catalyzed widespread global naval cooperation
that did indeed go a long way toward solving Admiral Mullen’s strategic problem.
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Concurrently with attempting to solve the strategic problem at hand, Vice
Admiral Morgan also tried to establish an institutionalized strategy process
within the office of the CNO (OPNAV). The process involved a formalized flow
of events—meetings, reviews, games, etc.—that crossed directorate boundaries
and also drew in external parties such as NWC. An instruction was drafted, but
it was never signed; in this writer’s view, it foundered because of opposition from
N8, which stood to lose its dominance, and Vice Admiral Morgan’s retirement.
In 2012, shortly after becoming CNO, Admiral Greenert requested a “refresh”
of CS21. Such a project was certainly warranted, as global geopolitical conditions
had significantly changed from 2007. However, still lacking any viable strategymaking apparatus, he turned once more to NWC for assistance. However, this
time, rather than a full research and analysis project, the refresh was supposed
to employ a rather short-fused drafting process, producing something within a
couple of months. NWC complied and duly produced a draft.
However, with no focused strategy team in place, and with the new and politically charged concept of air-sea battle ricocheting around the Pentagon, the
draft got put on the back burner. The lack of a well-defined strategy problem at
the time also contributed to inhibiting the creation of a new document. China
and Russia were clearly becoming threats, but the exact nature of a global naval
strategic problem was not yet clear. Admiral Greenert over the next two years
substituted his mantra of “warfighting first, operate forward, be ready” for a
new strategy document. Within OPNAV, strategy development fell prey to endless redrafting. Finally, after several years of such activity, the Navy produced a
“refresh” of CS21.
However, its relationship to the 2007 document was in name only, the new socalled CS21R being (in this writer’s view) essentially a pleading document aimed
at Congress for a larger Navy. To the extent that the Navy’s strategic problem in
2014 was a shrinking fleet owing to the Budget Control Act (sequestration), the
new document could be seen as supporting a strategy of influencing Congress.
However, it was not produced by a cadre of experienced strategists, nor was it the
product of a formal and disciplined institutional process.
The new CNO, Admiral John Richardson, has inherited a more clearly defined
and compelling strategic problem of global proportions that will require of the
Navy discerning strategic analysis. While the global maritime security problem
the 2007 CS21 addressed is, at least for the time being, apparently under control,
the growth of increasingly assertive Chinese and Russian naval power along with
a dire budget crunch at home poses a global naval strategic problem of unprecedented scope and complexity. Not only must the Navy reengineer its forces and
doctrine to deal with such new threats as antiship ballistic missiles; it must also
find a way to maintain effective presence in three or more widely separated areas
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/18
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of the Eurasian littoral to fight terrorism, support allies, and assemble a global
naval partnership against major-power expansionism.
Admiral Richardson has promulgated a guidance document entitled “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” It is not a strategy in the traditional
sense, but it establishes a set of criteria and lines of effort for the Navy to work
toward. The key concept embedded in it is fleet design. Given the restrictions on
the Navy’s authority (and ability) to craft actual strategies in the manner of the
1980s Maritime Strategy that Wills discusses, work on fleet design appears to be
an appropriate avenue of strategic analysis.
In the early 2000s, the threat of terrorists supporting another 9/11-style attack
on the United States via maritime smuggling created the need for a particular
kind of naval strategy. Today, the combination of factors just mentioned poses
another global strategic naval problem that needs to be solved. For various reasons, neither N8 nor N3/N5 is capable of solving it on its own. The CNO needs
to strengthen the strategy-development capabilities of the Navy Staff. This would
include establishing a mechanism whereby N3/N5 and N8 would work more
synergistically, bringing the right officers into those directorates and lengthening tours there, especially for leadership. In addition, he must create an effective
collaboration with a range of outside organizations, most directly NWC and the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).
The Navy is also working to produce a new cadre of strategists. Both NWC and
NPS have developed new, more-extensive programs to provide an educational
foundation for officers specializing in strategy. Whether this will bear fruit in
the future is uncertain, the strictures of G-N still being in place. If Wills is right
(and I believe he is), without the ability to detail officers to multiple tours in a
well-established strategy office, this education will go for naught. The CNO also
disestablished the Strategic Studies Group, a move that has generated quite a bit
of discussion among naval cognoscenti. I am not privy to his reasons, but I would
guess that he is looking to put some other mechanism in place that can generate
robust thinking about fleet design.
A second missing piece that Wills touches on but does not develop is the structure of the Unified Command Plan. In addition to the current strategic challenges
just mentioned, any new Navy strategy will have to contend with two other effects
of G-N: the many joint area of responsibility (AOR) boundaries that have been
drawn in the water, and the joint process of global force distribution.
In World War II, Admiral Ernest King, as both CNO and commander in chief,
had wide latitude for changing the longitude of U.S. naval forces; he could, within
the general strategic guidelines of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, move Navy
forces between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, and, within the Pacific theater,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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allocate forces between MacArthur and Nimitz. For King, the world ocean was a
unified theater of war.
Today there is no naval officer with such authority. The Navy’s precious few
ships are allocated via a joint consensus process whose inherent logic seems to
be to oil the squeakiest regional wheel. This does not allow easily for the application of a global naval strategy. At best, the CNO can bring the logic of a global
naval strategy—if he has one—to the meeting. Second, since the world ocean
is fragmented by joint AORs, the ability of modern naval forces to synchronize
fluidly across hemispheric swaths of ocean—an emerging operational necessity
—is compromised. These obstacles to the efficient and strategic application of
American sea power in peace and war are not likely to be removed by legislation.
Therefore a new Navy strategy—a new fleet design—will have to account for
them in some way.
Wills is right in everything he says, and he presents a good piece of history, of
which modern-day officers of all ranks should be aware. However, as discussed
here, there is more to the story, whose plot continues to unfold. It now falls to Admiral Richardson to resurrect somehow the Navy’s ability to develop and execute
a new form of global naval strategy.

ROBERT C. RUBEL

Captain, USN (Ret.)
Professor Emeritus, U.S. Naval War College

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/18

6829_InMyView.indd 169

6

6/9/16 8:16 AM

